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Abstract
I study transactions between aircraft manufacturers and airlines as well as airlines' utiliza-
tion of their eet. Aircraft production is characterized by economies of scale via learning-by-
doing, which creates a trade-o between current prot and future competitive advantage in
the aircraft market. The latter consideration makes large buyers more attractive than small
buyers and induces quantity discounts. The resulting nonlinear pricing strategy may distort
both production and allocation in favor of large buyers. In the data, there is a negative cor-
relation between the size of aircraft orders and the per-unit price, and a positive correlation
between the price paid and the utilization rate of the aircraft model. The pattern in the data
suggests that the manufacturers' price discrimination leads to misallocation of aircraft. To
assess whether there is an inecient allocation, I construct and estimate a dynamic model of
the aircraft market that includes a model of utilization. Using the estimated model, I conduct
counterfactual simulations where I nd that uniform pricing increases aircraft production by
10% and total welfare by 1.6%.
I am extremely thankful to Igal Hendel, David Besanko, Aviv Nevo, Rob Porter and seminar participants at
Northwestern University for their valuable comments and suggestions.
ySingapore Management University, School of Economics. email: kenonishi@smu.edu.sg
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1 Introduction
Most economic activities involve vertical relationships where upstream rms supply capital/intermediate
goods to downstream rms and downstream rms supply nal goods to consumers. In upstream
markets, price discrimination is common and aects competition in downstream markets via capi-
tal allocation. Though price discrimination in upstream markets may have a large impact in both
upstream and downstream markets, whether capital is eciently produced and allocated in vertical
relationships has been an open empirical question.
In this paper, I study the welfare consequence of price discrimination in the aircraft market
using detailed data on aircraft transactions and aircraft utilization. The richness in the data allows
me to study the connection between the vertical relationship in the aircraft (upstream) market
and productivity in the airline (downstream) market. I construct and estimate a model of the
industries in which competition and economies of scale in production lead to price discrimination in
the aircraft market with higher discounts to larger buyers. The existence of quantity discounts may
distort both production and allocation and leave room for improving social welfare from the policy
maker's point of view. For a xed production amount of aircraft, social welfare and productivity
improve in the airline market with aircraft reallocation. Also, potential policy interventions, such
as forcing manufacturers to post a uniform price, may induce more-intense competition and help
restore eciency in aircraft production.
To motivate the model, I rst present a set of descriptive regressions. In the data, I nd evidence
that manufactures are exercising quantity discounts, in which airlines that buy large quantities pay
less for each unit of aircraft. Also, I nd evidence that airlines paying more for each unit utilize the
aircraft more. These observations suggest the existence of aircraft misallocation. The production
of air transportation has two important inputs: the number of aircraft and utilization of the
aircraft. Prot maximizing airlines equate the marginal revenue, or the marginal productivity, to
the marginal price of the input. As a result, airlines facing a higher marginal price of aircraft buys
less aircraft and, instead, increases the utilization rate. The rst observation suggests that there
exists dispersion of the marginal price of aircraft. The second observation suggests that airlines
take the relative factor price into account when deciding the amount of inputs, i.e., airlines facing
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a higher marginal price of aircraft use the existing eet more intensively rather than buying more
aircraft, which creates a positive correlation between the price of aircraft ant the utilization rate.
From the social planner's point of view, however, the input decision needs to be made to minimize
the social cost of production. If the dispersion of the aircraft price is a result of strategic incentive
of manufacturers, the dispersion may create distortion in production of air transportation through
the input choice of airlines. This distortion is similar to those studies in Restuccia and Rogerson
(2008) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009). They consider a production function with capital and labor
as inputs and identify exogenous dispersion of capital price as the source of capital misallocation.
In this paper, I further study why there exists such dispersion in capital (aircraft) price rather
than treating it exogenous, and quantify the welfare consequence of such dispersion.
One possible explanation for the capital price dispersion is the existence of economies of scale
on the supply side. As pointed out in the existing literature, aircraft production is characterized
by a learning-by-doing eect. The learning-by-doing eect creates a trade-o between the current
prot and future intensity of competition. By lowering the current price aggressively, aircraft
manufactures can attract more orders, which translates into a lower marginal cost in the future.
To lower future competition intensity, buyers with larger orders are more attractive than buyers
with small orders. Serving a large buyer reduces the manufacturer's own future marginal cost
through the learning-by-doing eect and, at the same time, takes away the opponent's opportunity
to reduce the future marginal cost. This eect creates the incentive to strategically serve large
buyers by oering a quantity discount. If the quantity discount is a consequence of supply-side
factors, the allocation of aircraft may create ineciency because a large buyer receives a more
favorable price than a small buyer for the marginal unit, even though the small buyer is willing to
pay more for the marginal unit than the large buyer.
In this paper, I rst construct a simple model to show that the existence of economies of
scale together with competition among manufacturers may induce quantity discounts. I nd that,
in the model, forcing uniform pricing increases both production and total welfare. By forcing
uniform pricing, manufacturers do not compete by making a favorable oer to the large buyer but
simply by producing more. Intuitively, policy makers can force manufacturers to compete with
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equal intensity for all buyers, which may result in higher overall competition intensity and help
increase total welfare. Indeed, if the good is an aircraft, the model can explain the pattern in
the data. The strategic incentive of manufacturers induces quantity discount and dispersion of
aircraft price. Through airlines' prot maximizing choice of inputs, the dispersion further creates
dispersion of marginal capital productivity and utilization rate, which further translates into capital
misallocation and ineciency.
In the estimation, I build a dynamic model with economies of scale in production and multidi-
mensional heterogeneity|heterogeneity in protability and ease of investment|in airlines, where
manufacturers propose price menu as a function of product quantity and airline characteristics.
Manufacturers use the price menu to price discriminate among airlines and screen the ease of in-
vestment within airlines, which may create ineciency. The nature of the airline industry makes
the use of the standard Markov Perfect Equilibrium concept dicult. There are many airlines in
the market and, therefore, the dimension of the state space becomes too large to deal with. To
overcome this problem, I extend the Oblivious Equilibrium concept proposed by Weintraub et al.
(2008). I assume that aircraft manufacturers and airlines are partially oblivious of some states,
which makes the whole model tractable.
The object of interest in the estimation is the parameter on the airlines' utilization model and
the aircraft production model. The parameter on the utilization model and the heterogeneity in
protability among airlines are identied from the variation in the utilization rate. As Gavazza
(2011) and other papers on capital productivity note, productivity and the capital utilization rate
are closely tied. In the model, there is a one-to-one correspondence between marginal productivity
and the utilization rate, which allows for the identication of airlines' protability from the data.
The supply-side parameter is identied from the pricing optimality and variation across time. By
estimating the dynamic model of supply and demand, the static marginal cost of production is
identied. Then, by relating the static marginal cost to cumulative production, the marginal cost,
as a function of cumulative production, can be identied. In the estimation, I propose a simple
procedure to estimate models with oblivious equilibrium concepts.
Using the estimated parameters, I quantify the welfare loss caused by misallocation and evaluate
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the eectiveness of potential policy interventions. I nd that forcing manufacturers to post a single
uniform price increases aircraft production by 11% and total welfare by 1.6%, which suggests that
the intuition from the theoretical example still holds in the structrual model of the industry. I
also compare the result under \Grand Menu Pricing" regulation, where manufacturers are forced
to post a price menu that only depends on the quantity but not on airline characteristics. \Grand
Menu Pricing" allows manufacturers to price discriminate airlines by nonlinear pricing, which may
incrase aircraft production by screening airlines in the dimension of ease of investment. In fact, I
nd that \Grand Menu Pricing" regulation increases aircraft production by 10% and total welfare
by 3.3%.
2 Literature
This paper is related to several strands of the literature. First, this study is related to the literature
on input misallocation. Input reallocation has been understood as an important drive force of
aggregate TFP growth. Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009) estimate
that about 30% to 60% higher aggregate TFP growth can be achieved by input reallocation. As is
pointed out in the literature, one source of misallocation is input price dispersion.1 In this paper,
I study the implication of input price dispersion resulted from price discrimination in vertical
relationships.
Another important literature that the paper contributes to is the literature on non-linear pric-
ing and vertical relationships. The screening aspect of the non-linear pricing has been extensively
studied. The literature started in a monopoly setting with a focus on information asymmetry. Mi-
ravete (2002) and Miravete (2003) empirically examine the eect of uncertainty and information
asymmetry on the rm's pricing strategy. The literature has further grown to introduce competi-
tion. Stole (1995) shows that second degree price discrimination is sustainable even in a multi-rm
setting. There are number of papers including Rochet and Stole (2002) and Armstrong and Vickers
(2010) that further explore the role of non-linear pricing under oligopoly. In contrast to the intense
1Foster et al. (2008) points out that not only input but also output price dispersion is an important factor to
understand the productivity growth and reallocation.
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study of theoretical implication, little is known empirically. Busse and Rysman (2005) documents
the relationship between competition and the curvature of the price-quantity menu. Another
important aspect of non-linear pricing arise in vertical relationships between upstream and down-
stream rms. The primary interest is to identify if the rms use non-linear pricing to avoid double
marginalization. Villas-Boas (2002) establishes an estimation and inference method from market
level data. However, the actual transaction data is still ideally needed to understand the precise
structure of the market. Mortimer (2008) investigates the welfare implication of revenue sharing
between upstream and downstream rms using the actual contracts in the video rental industry.
In particular, this paper is closely related to the literature on the size-related buyers' purchasing
power. There is a growing literature on the buyer-size eect on price discounts. A number of
theoretical papers including Chipty and Snyder (1999), Snyder (1996) and Gans and King (2002)
shows the upstream competition may lead to quantity discounts. Ellison and Snyder (2010) em-
pirically shows that buyer-size eect on price discounts appears only under upstream competition
and there is no quantity discounts if the upstream rm is a monopolist. Sorensen (2003) studies
the transaction price between hospitals and insurers, and identies the buyer size as a source of
the price discount. The ndings in this paper are consistent with the literature. Furthermore, I
identify a new mechanism that induces quantity discounts and potential ineciency.
The third strand of the literature to which this paper is related is the literature on the learning-
by-doing. The empirical study of the learning-by-doing starts in engineering as early as Wright
(1936) in the aircraft production industry. The learning-by-doing eect attracted intense research
interest in economics, too. Spence (1981) analyzes the theoretical aspects of the relationship be-
tween the learning curve and competition. Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) analyzes the market per-
formance and strategic incentives in a model with a learning-by-doing eect. Cabral and Riordan
(1994) analyzes the strategic incentive coming from the learning-by-doing eect in a dierentiated
good market where two rms compete by setting price, and shows the possibility of predatory pric-
ing. In addition to the theoretical literature, there is a growing body of work on the estimation of
the learning eects. Thornton and Thompson (2001) estimates the eect of the learning-by-doing
in the wartime shipbuilding industry and Ohashi (2005) evaluates the eciency gain from the gov-
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ernment subsidy in the Japanese steel industry. Paired with the learning-by-doing, organizational
forgetting also attracted economists' attention. Benkard (2000), Levitt et al. (2012) and Thompson
(2007), among other papers, nd empirical evidence that there exists a learning-and-forgetting, and
Benkard (2004) estimates a model for commercial aircrafts with dynamic aspects of the learning-
and-forgetting. Besanko et al. (2010) conducts detailed analysis of the industry dynamics with a
learning-and-forgetting eect and concludes the existence of the learning-and-forgetting increase
the incentive to price more aggressively than the industries without learning-and-forgetting. The
theoretical and empirical literature on the learning-by-doing eect has emphasis on the production
without any strategic role on the demand side, and the price is simply taken as uniform to all
buyers. On the other hand, in the context of the aircraft market, the price dispersion is quite high
and non-linear pricing seems to play an important role to explain the market structure.
This paper is also related to the empirical literature on dynamic models. Dating back to Ericson
and Pakes (1995), dynamic models has been developed by series of authors including Bajari et al.
(2007), Pakes et al. (2007), etc.. I estimate the value function as a nonparametric function of
the sate. The idea of estimating the value function as a nonparametric function is presented in
Kalouptsidi (2010). In contrast to Kalouptsidi (2010), where the value function is estimated from
price data of used ship, I estimate the value function by relying on the within period variation of
players' investment decision.
3 Data
3.1 Basic Data Summary
The analysis presented in this paper is based on several dierent data sources: aircraft transaction
data that occurred from 1978 to 1991, airlines' aircraft utilization data, data on characteristics of
market participants and industry data book on production schedule, order history and delivery
history. 2
The rst data set is constructed based on the Department of Transportation and Federal Aviation
2Throughout this paper the transaction price is converted to the real price at 1991.
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Administration lings assembled by Avmark Inc.. DOT and FAA track histories of all commer-
cial aircraft operating in the United States. During the sample period, they collected data on
the aircraft transaction price, the aircraft serial number, and the buyer-seller identity. Table 1
summarizes the basic information contained in the data. In the data period, the main aircraft
manufacturers are Boeing and McDonnell Douglas. Airbus increased its presence later and in-
creased the competition intensity, which urged Boeing and McDonnell Douglas to merge in 1997.
During the data period, more than 5,000 aircraft were traded. About half of the transaction were
made in the primary market where aircraft manufacturers trade with airlines, and the rest were
made in the secondary market where airlines trade used aircraft each other. Though both primary
and secondary markets seem equally active, there are a huge dierence in the participants.3 The
main buyers in the secondary market are foreign airlines and cargo companies such as UPS and
FedEx, who buy used/old aircraft from domestic airlines. In the data period, the role of aircraft
leasing was not as important as now. The fraction of leased aircraft in the airlines' eet is more
than 40% in 2013, but it is less than 2% in 1980.4
Table 1: Transaction Data Summary
Data Period 1978 { 1991
Total Transaction 5122
Primary 2457
Secondary 2665
# of Manufacturers 7
Share of Boeing 63.44 %
Share of McDonnell Douglas 23.42 %
The second data set is constructed from Air carrier aircraft utilization and propulsion reliability
report published by FAA. This reports eets and total utilization hours of each model for each
airlines operating in the United States from 1979 to present. The utilization hours data are the
3The two largest sellers in the secondary market are Eastern Air Lines and United Airlines, and the two largest
buyers in the secondary market are FedEx and UPS.
4For example, see the article in Economist at http://www.economist.com/node/21543195.
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total utilization hours of each airline{aircraft model pair, but not the utilization hours of each
individual aircraft. To match the data period as close to the transaction data as possible, I use
the utilization data from 1979 to 1991. I constructed the remaining data set by combining a
several dierent data source: Air Carrier Financial Reports, Jet Airliner Production List and
data published on Boeing's website. After all combined, the data set contains basic nancial
characteristics of market participants and production schedules of each aircraft models. Table 2
summarize the basic information of the airline industries. The data period corresponds to just after
the deregulation in airline industries which created aggressive investment/disinvestment behavior
of airlines. Also, compared to 2010s, there are a lot more airlines in both major and regional
business. In terms of the market share, most of the market is served by the major airlines despite
of the large number of regional airlines. 5
Table 2: Airline Data Summary
Data Period 1979 { 1991
# of Airlines 37
Major Airlines 15
Regional Airlines 22
Asset Size of Airlines (in $ million) 1,666
(Standard Deviation) (2,195)
Flight Revenue (in $ million) 1,777
(Standard Deviation) (2,313)
Share of Major Airlines 91.31 %
From the data, I construct several new variables. The transaction data collected by DOT
and FAA track all the transaction, where the unit of observation is each transaction of individual
aircraft. To capture the eect of quantity in the transaction price, I aggregate the data in \airline{
model" level and \bargaining" level. First, I aggregate total transaction for each airline and
aircraft model pair. This airline{model paired quantity captures the total number of the same
aircraft that each airline purchased during the whole sample period. Here the unit of observation
5Here the major/regional airlines are dened as in the classication in Air Carrier Financial Reports.
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is the airline-model level. Also, by merging the transaction price data and order/delivery history
data, I construct total number of aircraft ordered and total price paid at each aircraft order. This
airline{model{bargain specic quantity and payment captures the size of each order. Here the unit
of observation is the airline{model{order level. Finally, I construct annual utilization rate from
the total utilization data and eet data. I rst construct the average utilization hours for each
airline and aircraft model. In the data, I see both each airlines' total ying hours and the number
of eet for each model, which allows me to calculate the airline{model specic average utilization
hours as the former divided by latter. Then, I take the mean value of the average utilization hours
across years and airlines and calculate the overall average utilization hours of each model. I dene
the airline{model specic utilization rate as the ratio between the airline{model specic average
utilization hours and the overall average utilization hours of the same model. Here the unit of
observation is airline{model{year level.
Table 3 shows the basic statistics of the price and quantity data. The rst row shows the price
dispersion in the data. The variable is dened as the transaction price over the mean price of the
same aircraft model. In the data, there are 2,457 transactions between manufacturers and airlines
in total. The mean value is one by construction but the median value is less than 1, which suggests
the existence of quantity discounts. The next two rows show the quantity dispersion. The variable
in the second row is the airline{model level total transactions dened above and captures the
purchase amount of the same aircraft model for each airline. The dispersion is quite large, where
some airlines just purchase one or two of the same aircraft but some airlines purchase more than 30.
The third row shows the quantity dispersion denominated by the total production. The variable
is constructed as the ratio of the variable in the second row divided by the total production in the
same period, and captures the share of a airline in the same model. The dispersion still remains
large. Some airlines have shares of less than 1% in a given model, but some airlines have shares
of more than 30%. The data show that the airlines' purchase behavior is quite heterogeneous in
both the price they pay and the quantities they buy.
Figure 1 and 2 shows examples of the price dispersion and the relationship between unit price
and airline ratio. Both gures are calculated from the data on transaction price of Boeing 737,
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Table 3: Price and Quantity Dispersion
10% 25% 50% 75% 90% mean std N
transaction price / model average price .842 .897 .966 1.059 1.198 1 .192 2457
airline - model paired quantity 1 2 3 10 26 9.90 18.18 248
airline ratio .006 .016 .041 .133 .285 .104 .149 248
The unit of observation is each transaction for the rst row and each airline-model pair for the second and
third rows. \airline ratio" is dened as airline{model paired quantities divided by the total production
during my sample period, and meant to capture the fraction of total production each airline accounts for.
which is the best selling aircraft in the data period. Figure 1 shows the nonparametric mean re-
gression result of the transaction price on the transaction year. The mean price is fairly stable over
the year, but there exists notable dispersion within year. Similarly, gure 2 shows the relationship
between airline ratio and the average unit price. There still exists dispersion in price, but gure 1
suggests that some part of the dispersion is explained by the dispersion in quantity.
Figure 1: Price Dispersion
This graph plots the transaction price of Boeing 737-
300 over time. Each dot represents one transaction.
Figure 2: Unit Price and Airline Ratio
This graph plots the average unit price of Boeing 737-
300 as a function of airline ratio. Each dot represents
one airline.
Figure 3 and 4 shows the utilization rate across airlines over time. Here the utilization rate is
dened as each airlines average utilization hours per aircraft divided by industry wide utilization
hours per aircraft.6 Within each year, there exists dispersion in utilization rate across airlines,
6Here the utilization rate is dened dierently from the one dened above. The average utilization hours are
the simply the total utilization hours of each airlines by pooling all aircraft model. I employ the new variable since
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but there exist no clear trend over time. In gure 4, I pick up three airlines (American Airlines,
Trans World Airlines and Southwest Airlines) to decompose the pattern in utilization rate into
each airline level. For each airline, there still exists dispersion in the utilization rate over time,
but gure 4 also suggests that main part of the dispersion in gure 3 comes from heterogeneity
in airlines. There are some airlines, including Southwest Airlines, that consistently utilize aircraft
more than the industry average, and some airlines that utilize aircraft consistently less. This
heterogeneity translates into high cross-sectional dispersion as indicated in gure 3.
Figure 3: Utilization Rate of All Airlines
This graph plots the utilization rate of each airlines.
Each dot represents one airline.
Figure 4: Example: Utilization Rate
This graph plots a example of the utilization rate.
Each circle represents the utilization rate of Amer-
ican Airlines, each triangular represents that of
Southwest Airlines, and each square represents that
of Trans World Airlines.
3.2 Descriptive Regression
In this subsection, I present evidence that suggests that (1) aircraft manufacturers price discrim-
inate airlines and use non-linear pricing strategies; (2) the manufacturers' price discrimination
creates ineciency in aircraft allocation and transportation production. For this purpose, I look
at the relationship between the unit price of aircraft and order quantities in the order data and
the relationship between the average unit price airline pays and the average annual utilization rate
gure 3 and 4 is meant to graphically show the pattern in the utilization rate across airlines. The airline{model
specic utilization rate is used in the regressions presented in the subsequent sections.
12
of the aircraft in the utilization data.
First, I present a negative correlation between the unit price and the order quantities to assess
if (1) aircraft manufacturers price discriminate airlines and use non-linear pricing strategies. In
order to analyze the correlation of these two variables, I use the data on transaction quantities and
the payment at each order, and regress the unit price of aircraft on the quantity measure and other
control variables. The regressions take the following form. For each unit price or price discounts
at each aircraft order,
yijt = qijt + x
0
ijt + ijt;
where yijt is either pijt, which is the unit price of the model j payed by airline i at time t, or dijt,
which is the discount ratio of transaction dened as
mean price of model j pijt
mean price of model j
. qijt is meant to capture
the eect of quantities on the price and discount. I use \airline ratio" and \order ratio" for this
regression. The rst variable is the same as in the third row of table 3 and the second variable
is dened as model j
0stotal quantity airline i bargained at timet
model j0s total quantity produced . I use the order fractions of total production
rather than absolute value of order quantities to normalize the eect of the quantity discount. The
total quantity produced vary from 34 to more than hundreds depending on the model and the
same amount of purchase among dierent models may have dierent meaning depending on the
production size.7 xijt includes variables such as observable characteristics of market participants,
time xed eect, model xed eect, airline-manufacturer pair xed eect.
Table 4 shows the regression result of the unit price and the discount ratio. The coecients
on both the airline ratio and order ratio suggest there exist quantity discounts. Introducing the
sellerbuyer pair dummy increase the number of regressor remarkably, which causes the loss of
signicance of the coecient on airline ratio. But the sign itself stays the same. Asset, domestic
revenue and international revenue are characteristics of buyers. The company size of buyers mea-
sured by their asset size does not have any signicant eect on the price they pay. The coecients
on the other variables suggest the nature of the market. First, the coecient on \cumulative ratio",
which is dened as model j
0stotal quantity produced up to time t
model j0s total quantity produced , has a signicant eect to reduce the price of
the aircraft. This result suggests that there is a learning-by-doing eect where cumulative produc-
7Instead of using denominated quantity, I also run the same regression on the actual quantity. The results are
qualitatively the same.
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tion experience decreases the marginal cost of production. Also, the \rival availability", dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 if there exists a similar aircraft sold by dierent manufacturers,
has a signicant eect to reduce the price, which suggests manufacturers face competition.
In the next set of regressions, I show the positive correlation between the price paid and
the utilization rate to assess if (2) the manufacturers' price discrimination creates ineciency in
aircraft allocation and transportation production. I regress the average annual utilization rate of
each model on the price paid and other control variables. The regressions take the following form.
For each annual utilization rate of each aircraft model,
uijt = pijt + y
0
ijt + eijt
where uijt is either the average utilization hours, which is dened as the airline i's average hours
of operation of model j at time t, or the average utilization rate, which is the average utilization
hours of airline i over the average utilization hours of all airlines within the same model. pijt is
meant to capture the eect of the price paid. I use two variables for pijt; the mean price airline i
paid to model j over the overall mean price paid to model j, and discount ratio of airline as dened
above. yijt includes the same control variables as xijt does in the previous set of regressions.
Table 5 shows the regression results. The results show a positive and signicant correlation
between the price paid and the utilization rate, which suggests the manufacturers pricing strategy
in the upstream market further aects how airlines behave in the airline (downstream) market.
3.3 Interpretation of the Descriptive Results
The data suggest that (I) there is dispersion in price within the same period; (II) the dispersion is
caused by manufacturers' non-linear pricing strategies; (III) the resulting non-linear pricing further
distorts aircraft allocation and air transportation production. Table 3 and gure 3 provide direct
evidence of price dispersion in the aircraft market and table 4 and gure 4 provide evidence that
aircraft manufacturers price discriminate airlines and use non-linear pricing strategies.8 Regarding
8To be precise, to argue that the manufacturers use non-linear pricing strategies, I need to provide the coun-
terfactual price as a function of the quantity rather than showing a negative correlation between the price and
quantities. Since I only observe the transaction price and quantity that actually happened rather than the com-
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Table 4: Regression of Unit Price and Discount Ratio
unit price unit price discount ratio discount ratio
airline ratio -43.60 -25.31 1.04 0.60
(11.15) (14.45) (0.24) (0.31)
order ratio -2.56 -2.38 0.08 0.10
(0.88) (0.89) (0.02) (0.02)
asset 4.84E-07 4.89E-07 -6.87E-09 -1.03E-08
(5.03E-07) (5.04E-07) (1.10E-08) (1.13E-08)
domestic revenue 1.46E-08 -5.28E-07 4.29E-09 3.28E-09
(7.58E-07) (7.74E-07) (1.66E-08) (1.68E-08)
intel revenue -2.10E-06 -3.21E-06 6.95E-08 9.17E-08
(9.19E-07) (9.63E-07) (2.02E-08) (2.08E-08)
cumulative ratio -11.72 -6.20 0.42 0.33
(5.38) (5.28) (0.12) (0.11)
rival availability -3.87 -3.45 0.14 0.11
(1.30) (1.30) (0.03) (0.03)
model dummy x x x x
seller dummy x x x x
airline dummy x x x x
airline x seller dummy - x - x
time dummy x x x x
other controls x x x x
Observation 388 388 388 388
Adjusted-R2 0.9628 0.9674 0.5674 0.6324
This table reports the estimated coecients of the OLS regression of the unit price and the discount ratio.
The dependent variable is the unit price at the order in the rst two columns and the discount ratio for
the last two columns. The unit of observation is a aircraft order which consists of the order quantity and
total payment. The unit price is dened as the total payment divided by the order quantity. The discount
ratio is dened as the mean price of the same model aircraft minus the unit price divided by the mean
price.
\asset" represents the asset size of the airline, \domestic revenue" represents the airlines' ight revenue
in the domestic routs, \intel revenue" represents the airlines' ight revenue in the international routs,
\cumulative ratio" represents the cumulative production fraction at the time the order was made and
\rival availability" represents a dummy variable that takes 1 if there was any other similar aircraft model
available.
For each variable, the rst row shows the estimates and the second shows the standard deviation. 
represents 1% signicance,  represents 5% signicance and  represents 10% signicance. Only subset
of variables are reported in the table. The coecients on both the airline ratio and order ratio suggest
there exist quantity discounts.
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Table 5: Regression of Average Utilization
Utilization Hours Utilization Rate Utilization Hours Utilization Rate
buyer price 57.34 0.20
/ mean price (26.22) (0.10)
discount ratio -71.03 -.28
(28.79) (.11)
eet 0.39 0.17E-2 0.40 0.17E-2
(0.08) (0.03E-2) (0.09) (0.03E-2)
asset -3.02E-06 -1.21E-08 -3.15E-06 -1.27E-08
(1.47E-06) (5.68E-09) (1.47E-06) (5.67E-09)
model xed eect x x x x
airline xed eect x x x x
other controls x x x x
Observation 989 989 989 989
Adjusted-R2 0.5999 0.4834 0.5993 0.4819
This table reports the estimated coecients of the OLS regression of the average utilization hours and
the average utilization rate. The dependent variable is the average utilization hours in the rst and the
third columns and the average discount ratio for the second and fourth columns. The unit of observation
is an annual utilization hours of each aircraft model in each airline's eet. The average utilization hours
are dened as the total utilization hours of each aircraft model divided by the number of the same model
aircraft in each airline's eet. The average utilization rate is dened as the average utilization hours
divided by the industry average utilization hours of the same aircraft model.
\eet" represents the number of aircraft that was in the airline's eet and \asset" represents the asset
size of the airline.
For each variable, the rst row shows the estimates and the second shows the standard deviation. 
represents 1% signicance,  represents 5% signicance and  represents 10% signicance. Only subset
of variables are reported in the table.
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(III), the positive correlation between the price and the utilization rate is a natural observation
given the price dispersion. Consider a air transportation production function with complementarity
between aircraft and utilization, such as y = f(K;U) = KU where K denotes the number of
aircraft and U denotes the utilization rate. Prot maximizing airlines equate the marginal revenue
from aircraft to the price of aircraft, and equate the marginal revenue from utilization to the
cost of utilization. With complementarity between aircraft and utilization, the relative cost of
aircraft and utilization aects the input choice of airlines. Airlines facing a higher price of aircraft
decreases the input amount of aircraft and, instead, increases the input amount of utilization.
For example, in the case of the Cobb{Douglas production function, U
K
= r
w


where r denotes the
aircraft price and w denotes the cost of utilization. Such prot maximizing behavior of airlines
creates a positive correlation between the price of aircraft and utilization rate. However, from social
welfare point of view, the input choice should be made to minimize the social cost of production. If
the aircraft price dispersion is a result of manufacturers' strategic behavior, the input choice does
not necessary minimizing social cost. Table 5 provides evidence that the aircraft price dispersion
aects the production behavior of airlines. According to the argument above, such eect may
creates ineciency by distorting airlines' input choice. The natural next questions are how much
the ineciency is and what kind of policy intervention can help us restore eciency. To answer
those questions, I start building a dynamic model of the aircraft and airline industries from the
next section.
4 Model
Before moving to the full model that I estimate structurally, I describe a simple theoretical example
to motivate the counterfactual simulation I conduct in the later section of this paper. In this
example, I show that uniform pricing has a pro-competitive eect with economies of scale in
plete menu of the price-quantity relationship, the correlation can be always rationalized by a linear pricing strategy
with transaction specic slopes. However, it is a known fact that order quantities are an important factor to get
discounts when manufacturers and airlines negotiate over the price. The following articles in Bloomberg and the
Economist are the examples that support that the manufacturers price discriminate airlines and use a non-linear
pricing strategy. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-28/air-lease-expands-with-3-2-billion-order-for-boeing-
777s.html, http://www.economist.com/blogs/gulliver/2013/06/easyjet .
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production.
4.1 Motivating Example
This subsection describe a simple motivating example to argue how the learning-by-doing eect
leads to quantity discounts and how uniform pricing help us restore eciency. Those readers who
are interested in empirical analysis can proceed directly to the next subsection. Seller
Suppose there are two rms, S1 and S2, selling a homogeneous intermediate good in two periods
and the two sellers have the same production function. The marginal cost of production is constant
within each period, but exhibits dynamic economies of scale via a learning-by-doing eect. Let
the marginal cost of production be
MCt(qti) = c  kqt 1i ;
where qt 1i is the cumulative production amount of rm i up to period t   1, and k captures the
degree of learning-by-doing. Assuming there is no discounting.
Buyer
At each period, short-lived buyers arrive at the market. Buyers are heterogeneous in their demand
of the good. Let Dtj(p) = D
t
j   p denote the demand function of buyer j 2 f1; 2g in period t. I
assume that Dt1 > D
t
2.
Game Structure
The timing of the pricing and purchase decision is the following.
Period 1
1. Two buyers arrive the market.
2. Two seller simultaneously oer a (possibly dierent) liner price to each buyer.
3. Each buyer decides how much to buy the good given the oered price.
Period 2 The same structure repeats.
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To simplify the analysis and to avoid complication coming from a tie, assume downstream rms
choose to buy from S1 if the same price is oered.
Proposition 1: There is an equilibrium with quantity discounts in the rst period where the seller
oers a lower price to the buyer with the higher demand.
Proof: In Appendix. 
The intuition behind the proposition is simple. Even though the sellers have the same production
function, the learning-by-doing eect creates market power in the second period due to the dier-
ence in the production in the rst period. If one of the seller produces more in the rst period,
the seller has lower marginal cost than its rival and, therefore, it can earn positive prot in the
second period. Such eect is foreseen and the sellers compete to produce more in the rst period.
To produce more in the rst period, the sellers need to attract the buyer with the higher demand
and compete to oer a low price. As a result, the positive prot in the second period is competed
away to oer the lowest possible price for the buyer with the higher demand. On the other hand,
the competition for the buyer with the lower demand is looser since attracting only the buyer with
lower demand is not enough to produce more than the rival seller.
Eect of Uniform Pricing
Now suppose we force the seller to set the uniform price for all buyers. Now, the second period
prot is not competed away in the competition for the buyer with the higher demand. Instead,
now the sellers need to set the lowest uniform price to produce more in the rst period. As a result,
the second period prot is not competed away to get the buyer with the higher demand. Rather, it
is competed away to oer the lowest price, which increases the total quantity produced in the rst
period. Note that, given the environment, the production quantity in the rst period is sucient
statistics for welfare comparison. Figure 5 shows the rst period production quantity on the left
and the rst period price that the large buyer faces on the right as a function of k, the degree
of the learning-by-doing eect. Uniform pricing achieves higher production quantity than price
discrimination in total. However, the price the large buyer faces is lower under price discrimination.
When there is no learning-by-doing eect, the model is the same as the usual Bertrand competition
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model. As the eect become larger, the strategic incentive of price discrimination increases and
the dierence in outcome becomes larger.
Figure 5: Price Dispersion vs Uniform Pricing
This graph plots the production quantity in the rst period and the rst period price that the large buyer faces under price discrimination scheme and
uniform pricing scheme. The horizontal axes represent dierent value of k, the magnitude of the learning-by-doing eect. The vertical axes represent the
quantity and price, respectively. The red solid lines show the value under price discrimination and the blue dashed line show the value under uniform
pricing scheme.
The parameter value is xed at Dt1 = 200, D
t
2 = 100 and c = 50.
The pro-competitiveness of uniform pricing has an intuitive explanation. With price discrimi-
nation, the buyer with the higher demand can force the sellers to treat him better since they can
foresee that attracting her is necessary to have lower marginal cost in the second period. On the
other hand, the sellers also have an incentive to exploit as much from the buyer with the lower
demand and the buyers in the second period. As a result, the competition for the buyer with
higher demand become intense but the competition for the other buyer becomes loose. Uniform
pricing eliminates such eect and force the seller to compete with equal intensity for both buyers,
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which creates the pro-competitive eect.
4.2 Timing and Game Structure of the Full Model
The previous example is illustrating eectiveness of uniform pricing. However, it does not tell us
if we can apply the same reasoning in a vertical structure and/or in the actual situation in the
aircraft and airline industries. Let me now introduce the full model of the industries to further
analyze the consequence of price discrimination in the aircraft and airline industries.
Time, indexed by t, is discrete and innite. At every t, each manufacture, indexed by j,
announce the price schedule of its products, indexed by m 2 Mj, as a function of quantity and
airline characteristics. At each period, airlines, indexed by i, utilize their current eet, and at the
end of the period they choose their eet for the next period given the price schedule of the aircraft.
The timeline of the model at each period is the following:
1. Airlines draw observable idiosyncratic shocks on cost of aircraft utilization
2. Airlines simultaneously decide how much to utilize their eet and compete with their uti-
lization hours
3. Each manufacture announces its price schedules as a function of quantity and airline char-
acteristics
4. Airlines draw idiosyncratic shock on the cost of investment for each model and decide their
next period eet
4.3 Period Payo from Utilization
At the beginning of the period, each airline draws idiosyncratic shocks, it = (
1
it;    ; Mit ), on
utilization cost of each model. The airline i's cost of utilizing a model m aircraft for u hours is
cm(u; mit ) = c
m
0 + u (c
m
1 + c
m
2 u+ 
m
it ) ;
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where cm1 + c
m
2 u+ 
m
it captures the marginal cost of utilization.
If airline i has fmit units of aircraft and if the average utilization hours of model m is u, then the
total cost of operation and total utilization hours are
fmit  cm(u; mit ) and fmit  u;
respectively. Also, at every t, airline i faces a residual demand function given the utilization
decision of all other airlines. Airline i faces the following inverse demand curve
P ti (Qi; Q i) = dt + i   1Qi   2
X
j 6=i
Qj;
where Ql is airline l's total utilization hours, dt is the time specic protability of unit utilization
hour at period t and i is the airline specic protability of utilization.
The utilization decision of each airline is static and airlines compete by the utilization hours given
their eet. Additional to the aircraft each airline owns, airlines can operates aircraft leased form
nancial companies. Let rmt denote the rental cost of an aircraft at period t and l
m
it denote the
number of aircraft that airline i rents at period t. Here I assume the leasing market and the
used aircraft market is competitive and the rental price is determined exogenously. Then the best
response function of airline i given Q i can be dened as
BRti(Q it) = argmax
Qit;Lit
( 
dt + i   1Qit   2
X
j 6=i
Qjt
!
Qit
 
MX
m=1
 
fmit + l
m
it

cm(umit ; 
m
it )
 
MX
m=1
lmit r
m
t
)
s.t. Qit =
MX
m=1
 
fmit + l
m
it

umit ;
where Lit = (l
1
it;    ; lMit ) denotes a vector that counts i's number of the rental choice of aircrafts.
Also, let Fit = (f
1
it;    ; fMit ) denote the vector that represents airline i's eet in the subsequent
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section in this paper.
Since airlines simultaneously decide their utilization hours, Nash equilibrium is characterized as
the xed point of the best response function. The prot each airline derive at each period in
equilibrium is
t(Q

it; Q

 it; i) =
 
dt + i   1Qit   2
X
j 6=i
Qjt
!
Qit
 
MX
m=1
 
fmit + l
m
it

cm(umit ; 
m
it ) 
MX
m=1
lmit r
m
t
s.t. Qit =
MX
m=1
 
fmit + l
m
it

umit ;
where (Qit; L

it) = BR
t
i(Q

 it).
4.4 Investment Decision
Let ti(Ft) be the expected prot of airline i at period t in the equilibrium of the game de-
scribed above as a function of airlines' eet Ft = (F1t;    ; FIt). Suppose airline i is expecting
the sequence of airlines' eet fF itg1t=s and the sequence of aircraft pricing menu fpt(q; ) = 
p1t (q
1; );    ; pMt (qt; )
g1t=s. Airline i maximizes the expected discounted sum of the future prot
dened as follows:
Vs(Fis; i; fF itg1t=s; fpt(q; )g1t=s) = maxfFitg1t=s E
P1
t=s+1 
(t s)  ti(Ft)  pt 1 qit; i+ 0it qit
subject to Fit+1 = 
f
itFit + qit;
(1)
where it = (
1
it;    ; Mit ) is a model specic idiosyncratic shock on the cost of investment and fit
is the depreciation rate of aircraft.9 By the recursive structure, airline i's investment strategy can
be characterized as a maximization problem of the following object. At each period, airline i's
9Here I assume the depreciation of aircraft is exogenous to all model variables.
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strategy given ps() is,
(Fis; i; is;fF itg1t=s; fpt(q; )g1t=s)
= max
Fis+1
 ps qis; Fis; i+ 0is qis+ Vis+1(Fis+1; i; fF itg1t=s; fpt(q; )g1t=s)	 :
4.5 Aircraft Production and Pricing
In this subsection, I describe the model of aircraft production and manufacturers' pricing strategy.
First, I dene the production environment of the aircrafts. At period t, manufacture j has a
static constant marginal cost of producing one unit of model m aircraft, MCmjt . The marginal cost
depends on the manufacturer's current experience, Emt , and dened as
MCmjt = mc
m
jt(E
m
t ); where
dmcmjt(E)
dE
< 0:
The experience evolves according to the following process. Let the production amount of aircraft
model m at period t denote by qmt , then
Emt+1 = E
m
t + q
m
t :
Note that the production experience exhibits \learning-and-forgetting", which is a common phe-
nomenon in capital production.10 Under the production environment, the period prot of the
manufacture j can be described as follows. Let pmjt() denotes the price-quantity schedule of air-
craft model m and let qmit denotes airline i's demand of aircraft model m at period t. Then the
manufacture j's period prot at t, ptjt (Ejt; qt), is described as
ptjt (Et; qt) =
X
m2Mj
 X
i2I
pmjt(q
m
it ; i)  qmt mcmjt(Emt )
!
;
where qmt =
P
i2I q
m
it .
10Benkard (2000) provide empirical evidence of \learning-and-forgetting" in aircraft production. There are also
a number of papers, including Levitt et al. (2012) and Thompson (2007), that provide evidence of the phenomenon
in dierent industries.
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Suppose manufacturer j is expecting the airlines' investment strategy, , the sequence of air-
lines' eet, fFtg1t=s, and the sequence of aircraft pricing menu of its rival manufacturer, fp jt(q; )g.
Manufacturer j maximizes the expected discounted sum of the future prot dened as follows. Now,
let pjt(q; ; Et; Ft) denote the price menu manufacture j propose given the state of manufacturers
and airlines. The value function of manufacturer j is dened as
Vjs(Es; ; fFtg1t=s; fp jt(q; )g) = maxfpjt()gE
" 1X
t=s
(t s)ptjt (Et; qt) j fpt()g
#
; (2)
where qt and the evolution of state Et are induced from the investment strategy of airlines and
its rival's pricing strategy. By the recursive structure, manufacturer j's pricing strategy can be
characterized as a maximization problem of the following object. At each period, manufacturer
j's strategy is,
pjs = 
p
j (Es;Fs; ; fp jt(q; )g)
= max
p

E

psjs (Es; qs) + Vjs(Es + qs; ; fFtg1t=s; fp jt(q; )g) j p
	
:
4.6 Solution Concept
To close the model, I use Oblivious Equilibrium as the solution concept in this paper. Oblivious
Equilibrium(OE) is a solution concept proposed by Weintraub et al. (2008), in which each rm
is assumed to make decisions based only on its own state and knowledge of the long-run average
industry state, but not on the current information about competitors' states. OE is convenient
in industries with many rms, and Weintraub et al. (2008) provides reasons to use OE as a close
approximation to Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE).
In this paper, I make the following two assumptions.
Assumption 1. Airlines play Oblivious strategy. When airline i makes its investment decision,
it bases its decision only on its own eet, current proposed pricing menu and the long-run average
industry state. In particular, when airline i takes expectation of expression (1), it takes expectation
given the sequence of airlines' eet fF it = F  ig1t=s and the sequence of aircraft pricing menu
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fpt() = p()g1t=s, where F  i and p() is the long-run average eet of airlines and the pricing
menu of manufacturers.
Assumption 2. Manufacturers play Oblivious strategy, where they are oblivious of airlines' actual
eet. When manufacturer j decides the pricing menu of its product, it bases its decision only on
its own state, other manufacturers' states and the long-run average industry state of airlines. In
particular, when manufacturer j takes expectation of expression (2), it takes expectation given the
sequence of airlines' eet fFt = F g1t=s.
The most related paper to these assumptions is Benkard et al. (2013), where the authors develop
an application of OE to to concentrated industries. In the paper, the authors dene an extended
notion of oblivious equilibrium, Partially Oblivious Equilibrium (POE), in which the state of a
subset of players enter into the players' strategies. Since players ignore the actual state of all other
players in OE, POE is a generalization of OE in the sense that the players take the actual state
of some of the players into account. Since there are more than thirty airlines in the data, the
dimension of the state variables is too large to solve the model using Markov Perfect Equilibrium.
Adopting OE (POE) makes the model tractable and feasible to estimate. Also, since there are a
large number of airlines, assuming players are oblivious of the actual state of airlines may work as
a good approximation of MPE.
5 Estimation and Identication
In the estimation, I take three steps to estimate the whole model. First, I estimate the parameters
on the utilization model and the airline specic protability. The utilization model is a completely
static model and it can be estimated from the static optimality of the observed utilization decision
separately from all the remaining model. Using the estimates, I next estimate the value function
of the airlines where I heavily take advantage of the oblivious assumptions. By substituting
the estimated airline specic protability and putting distributional assumptions on the cost of
investment, I estimate the value function nonparametrically. Finally, I estimate the parameters on
the production model. With the estimated value function of airlines, I can estimate the outcome of
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the transaction between manufacturers and airlines for any arbitrary pricing menus. The optimality
of the observed pricing menus induces a set of inequalities, which identies the parameter. In this
section, I describe the estimation and identication step by step.
To simplify the notation, fF i g and fp(q; )g are not explicitly written when I write down the
value function.
5.1 Utilization Model
I specify the inverse demand curve as follows. Since major airlines and regional airlines shows
dierent patterns in the utilization, I allow the parameter to take dierent values between these
two types of airlines.
The inverse demand function takes the following form if airline i is a major airline
P ti (Qi; Q i) = dt + i   majorQi  
X
j 6=i;j2major
majormajorQj  
X
j 6=i;j2regional
regionalmajor Qj;
and if airline i is a regional airline
P ti (Qi; Q i) = dt + i   regionalQi  
X
j 6=i;j2major
majorregionalQj  
X
j 6=i;j2regional
regionalregionalQj;
where  captures the airline specic protability of utilization and dt captures the time specic
demand sifter. Also, I specify the cost of utilization as
cm(u; mit ) = c0 + u (c
m
1 + c
m
1 u+ 
m
it ) :
where  captures the increasing marginal cost of utilization and mit is independent across time,
model and airlines.
Assumption 3 (Distributional of the Shock on the Utilization Cost). s are distributed identically
and independently as N(0; 2 ).
Assumption 4 (Distribution of the Demand State). dts are distributed identically and indepen-
dently as N(d; 2d).
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The parameter to be estimated is d = (d1;    ; dT ),  = (1;    ; I), , c0, c1 = (c11;    ; cM1 ),
 and 2 . The data contains annual utilization hours, c
m
it and the leasing decision of airlines, l
m
it .
One important missing information is the rental cost aircraft, which I estimate using the data on
the transaction price of used aircraft.
Assumption 5 (Leasing Market). The aircraft leasing market and secondary market are compet-
itive and the rental price of aircraft is distributed as N(r; 2r) at each year.
This assumption allows me to estimate the rental cost of aircraft. In the data, I observe the
transaction price of aircraft, which is informative about the cost of holding an aircraft for one year.
Suppose a leasing company buy an aircraft at year t and sell it at t+1, the dierence in the aircraft
price at t and t + 1 is the rental cost of the aircraft under the assumption of competitiveness. In
the subsequent analysis, I substitute the estimated rental price in the estimation of the utilization
model parameter.11 The parameter is identied from the variation in the utilization rate and the
variation in rental choice. For a xed eet, airlines equate the marginal cost and the marginal
revenue of utilization. The variation in the utilization rate identies the relative value of the
parameter of utilization cost and protability. For example, the relative value of dt and is are
identied from the relative level of utilization rate across airlines and time. Conditional on the eet,
the variation in utilization rate across airlines identies the relative level of i, and the variation
in overall utilization level across year identies that of dt. The rental choice identies the absolute
level of the parameter.
11In the estimation of the rental price, I rst estimate the used aircraft price nonparametrically for each model,
m, and year, t. I specify the estimation equation as
pmlt = p
m
t (agelt) + "
m
lt ;
where l is a index for transactions, pmlt is the observed transaction price of model m aircraft that is agelt year old
and "mlt is meant to capture measurement error. Gavazza (2011) notes that the actual transaction price is explained
well by the list price, which is calculated by the age of the model. The rental price is estimated by
rmt = cpmt ([agelt)  dpmt+1([agelt + 1);
where[agelt is the average age of the model m used aircraft traded at time t and  is the discount factor. Here I
set the discount factor to be 0.95.
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The optimal utilization hours of airline i satises
@P ti (Qit; Q it)  Ci(Qit)
@umit
= 0
, P ti (Qt)  iumit   (cm1 + 2cm1 u+ mit ) = 0 8m:
This equality conditions translate into a set of moment equality, which is
E
" 
dt   i   1Qit   2
X
 i
Q it
  1umit    cm1 + 2cm1 umit 
#
= 0 8m; i; t:
The absolute value of the parameter and c0 is identied from the optimality of the rental choice.
The cost increasing (benet of decreasing) the observed rental choice can not be larger than the
decrease (increase) in the per unit utilization cost, which identies the xed cost, c0, and the
absolute value of the parameter. The rental decision of airline i satises the optimality condition
as follows.
max
Qit;Lit
 
dit   iQit  
X
j 6=i
jQjt
!
Qit
 
MX
m=1
 
fmit + l
m
it

cm(umit ; 
m
it ) 
MX
m=1
lmit r
m
t
 max
Qit;Lit 6=Lit
 
dit   iQit  
X
j 6=i
jQjt
!
Qit
 
MX
m=1
 
fmit + l
m
it

cm(umit ; 
m
it ) 
MX
m=1
lmit r
m
t
This inequality conditions translate into a set of moment inequality conditions for the parameters.
I estimate the parameter by minimizing the objective function which has both the above equality
and inequality conditions.
5.2 Investment Decision
First, I specify the distribution of the shocks on investment cost.
29
Assumption 6 (Distributional Assumption on the Error). s are distributed identically and in-
dependently as N(0; 2).
At each period, airline i maximizes the value function given the proposed price menus and the
period shock on investment cost. In the maximization problem, fps
 
qis; i
g can be backed out
from the data. Therefor the only dynamic part to be estimated is the value function. With the
distributional assumption on , the optimality of the airlines' eet choice induces the likelihood of
the data.
I take two steps in the estimation of the value function. In the rst step, I estimate the manu-
facturers' pricing menus nonparametrically. In the second step, I substitute the estimated pricing
menus in the likelihood function and estimate the value function nonparametrically by sieve MLE.
From the optimality of the airline i's investment decision,
qis = (Fis; i) = argmax
q
 ps q; i+ 0is q+ Vis+1(q + fFis; i)	 :
If the price menu is observed, the condition above translates into conditions on the range of is.
From the optimality condition, changing qis to qis + 1 or qis   1 gives,
   ps qis; i  ps qis + 1; i+ (Vis+1(qis + fFis; i)  Vis+1(qis + 1 + fFis; i))  is
   ps qis; i  ps qis   1; i+ (Vis+1(qis + fFis; i)  Vis+1(qis   1 + fFis; i))   is:
Therefore, the probability of observing qis in the data is equal to
Pr

   ps qis; i  ps qis + 1; i+ (Vis+1(qis + fFis; i)  Vis+1(qis + 1 + fFis; i))
 is 
 
ps
 
qis; i
  ps qis   1; i  (Vis+1(qis + fFis; i)  Vis+1(qis   1 + fFis; i)):
(3)
By approximating the value function by a sieve function, I can estimate the parameter on the sieve
function by MLE. However, this approach is not feasible because the price menu is not observed
and, therefore, a two step approach is needed.
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In the data, I observe (pmit ; q
m
it ; bi) for each aircraft order, which allows me to estimate the price menu
nonparametrically. In the rst step, I estimate the pricing menu using the following specication.
For each t,
pmit = p
m
t
 
qmit ; i

+ emit;
where emit is independent with q
m
it and i.
12 Here emit is meant to capture measurement error in
the data. By approximating pmt by a sieve function and substituting bi for i, the price menu can
be estimated by a standard nonparametric regression method. Also, I estimate the depreciation
rate of aircraft, f , from the owned eet data directly by estimating the following equation by
OLS:
fmi;t+1   qmit = ffmit + efmit;
where e
f
mit is assumed to mean zero and independent with all model variable.
In the second step, I substitute cpmit , bi and bf for pmit , i and f in the expression (3), which
induces the likelihood of the data as
Pr

    bps qis; bi  bps qis + 1; bi+ (Vis+1(qis + fFis; bi)  Vis+1(qis + 1 + fFis; bi))
 is 
  bps qis; bi  bps qis   1; bi  (Vis+1(qis + fFis; bi)  Vis+1(qis   1 + fFis; bi)):
(4)
As long as bps and bi are consistent for pmit and i, the probability in expression (3) and (4) are
asymptotically equivalent. Therefore, sieve MLE in which I maximize the likelihood in expression
(4) gives a consistent estimator for the airline's value function. 13
12Under the model, the price menu is a function of the state and it should be estimated as a function of the state
rather than than an independent function for each t. However, the state of manufacturers is not observed since
the depreciation rate of the experience, , is unknown and it is infeasible to estimate it as a function of the state.
One alternative estimation strategy is to jointly estimate the production side parameter, but it is computationally
demanding. In order to estimate the airlines' value function, a consistent estimator of the price menu for each t is
sucient.
13In the estimation, I approximate the objective by a polynomial function of its argument.
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5.3 Aircraft Production
In this subsection, I describe the estimation of the aircraft production parameter. First, I specify
the production technology as follows.
MCmjt = mc
m + 
 
(Emt )
  ; Emt+1 = Emt + qmt ;
where ,  and  is the parameter to be estimated.
The estimation relies on simulations similar to Bajari et al. (2007). Let Vj(Et; 
p) denote the
expected discounted sum of the future prot of manufacturer j when manufacturers play strategy
p. The optimality of the observed pricing menu gives the following inequality conditions.
Vj(Et; 
p)  Vj(Et; pj ; p j) 8pj ; j : (5)
Given the estimated value function of airlines, I can simulate the transaction outcome for arbitrary
pricing menus. Therefore, I can simulate both left and right hand side of the inequality, which
construct a set of inequality conditions. I assume that the production parameter is identied by the
inequality conditions and the parameter can be estimated similar to the method proposed by Bajari
et al. (2007). A notable dierence from Bajari et al. (2007) comes from the fact that the exact state
is not observed in my model. Even though I see the complete history of the aircraft production
history, the exact state is a function of the depreciation rate of the experience, , and the production
history. When I simulate Vj(Et; 
p; m) for a xed parameter value m, I rst calculate Et().
Given the value of Et(), I next estimate the observed price menu as a nonparametric function
of Et(), quantity and bi. After I estimate the value function of airlines and observed pricing
strategy, I can simulate the sequence of market outcome for arbitrary length, which gives the value
of Vj(Et; 
p; m) by taking the average of many dierent sequence of market outcome. Similarly,
by creating an alternative pricing strategy, I can simulate the value of Vj(Et; 
p
j ; 
p
 j). I estimate
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the parameter using the inequality (5). To be precise, the estimator, b, is
b = argminX
j
X
alt

min
n
Vj(Et; 
p)  Vj(Et; p;altj ; p j); 0
o2
:
6 Result and Counterfactual
In this section, I present the estimation and counterfactual result. Table 6 shows the main esti-
mates of the parameter.  captures the increasing part of the marginal cost of utilization. Since the
marginal cost of utilization is increasing, the dispersion in the utilization rate implies the welfare
loss. For any xed amount of total utilization hours, the total utilization cost is minimized when
the utilization rate is equalized among airlines. In the aircraft production,  captures the produc-
tion cost that goes to 0 as the manufacturers' experience goes to innity. The learning-by-doing
accounts for up to about 30% of the total cost of production. Compared to the existing literature,
the estimates are in a reasonable range. Benkard (2000) reports the forgetting rate to be about
61% and the eect of the cost reduction to be about 40%. 14
Table 6: Estimated Parameters
Utilization Model Production Model
Parameter Estimates Parameter Estimates
m 1.6250e-004 MCboeing 18.1790
[1.6250e-004,1.6250e-004] [ 11.8071, 24.5026 ]
r 0.1372 MCMcD 20.6391
[0.1372,0.1372] [14.0366, 25.5326 ]
c0 0.1218  7.5892
[0.1218,0.1218] [6.3708, 10.6718]
c1 0.0894  0.2692
[0.0790,0.0923 ] [0.2691, 0.2692]
 0.5376  0.7296
[0.5376,0.5376] [0.7182, 0.7368]
The condence intervals are calculated by Bootstrap. The estimates for c1s are reported as the mean
value of all aircraft models. MCboeing and MCMcD are the mean value of the constant production cost
of aircraft produced by Boeing and McDonell Douglas, respectively.
14Levitt et al. (2012) and Thompson (2007) report much higher depriciation rate. They report the estimates for
 (compounded for annual rate) to be about 20% to 50%.
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In the counterfactual analysis, I compare the equilibrium market outcome and welfare under
two alternative market designs: the manufacturers post a single uniform price to all airlines for
each of their products (Uniform Pricing); the manufacturers post one price-quantity menu to all
airlines for each of their products (Grand Menu Pricing).15 The rst counterfactual analysis is
motivated by the theory side. The theoretical example presented in the previous section suggests
that regulating manufacturers' pricing by uniform pricing policy increases total welfare. The
natural next question is that if this prediction is still true in the industry and, in case if it is true,
how much welfare gain can be made by potential policy interventions. The second contractual
analysis is motivated from from antitrust point of view. Under the current situation, dierent
airlines faces dierent marginal price even after controlling for the quantity, which may distort
fair competition in the airline market. The manufacturers' pricing favor particular airlines, the
favored airlines can take competitive advantage in the airline market through capital allocation
and other airlines may harm from that. Robinson-Patman Act (Secondary-Line) forbids seller to
price discriminate buyers if the price discrimination creates harm in competition among buyers.
The advantage and disadvantage of the act has been extensively studied16 and this counterfactual
analysis provides an additional view on this topic by assessing the market outcome and welfare
under a situation where all downstream rms have access to the same price menu.
Table 7 shows the counterfactual equilibrium outcome compared to the current situation. The
rst half of the table shows the counterfactual outcome under the uniform pricing regulation. By
forcing uniform pricing, the average price of aircraft decreases and the production amount increases
for both Boeing and McDonnell Douglas. The increase in aircraft production results in more total
utilization hours and lower utilization rates. Since the marginal cost of utilization is increasing
and the average aircraft price has decreased, airlines buy more aircraft and decrease the utilization
rate, which ends up in lower the utilization rate. Similar patterns are reported in the second half
of the table 7. The second half reports the equilibrium outcome under the grand menu pricing
regulation. Under the grand menu pricing, manufacturers can still sort airlines by proposing
non-linear pricing menu, but manufacturers need to oer the same menu to all airlines. Since
15The computation of the counterfactual equilibrium is described in the appendix.
16Though it is an important regulation to maintain fair competition, the Robinson-Patman act has been rarely
eective recently. See Luchs et al. (2010) for a detailed summary.
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Table 7: Counterfactual Outcome
Uniform Pricing
Boeing McDonnell Douglas Total Airlines
Average Price Change  9:46%  5:59%  8:45% {
Average production Change 12:34% 6:02% 10:59% {
Utilization Rate { { {  9:32%
Total Utilization Hours { { { 0:28%
Grand Menu Pricing
Average Price Change  6:54%  12:56%  8:28% {
Average production Change 8:32% 14:71% 10:01% {
Utilization Rate { { {  7:44%
Total Utilization Hours { { { 1:89%
the menu can be non-linear, the pricing can creates dispersion in the marginal price. However,
allowing a non-linear pricing has, at least, two advantages over uniform pricing. Under uniform
pricing regulation, both upstream rms and downstream rms suer from double-marginalization,
which may be mitigated by allowing non-linear pricing. Also, non-linear pricing helps upstream
rms to screen downstream rms in the dimension of unobserved demand size. It is theoretically
known that, under the existence of asymmetric information in buyers' demand, allowing sellers to
design non-linear pricing to screen the buyers helps to increase production. These two positive
eect on aircraft production oset the ineciency coming from dispersion in marginal price. The
important take away from table 7 is that both counterfactual results suggest that the main source
of ineciency is manufacturers' price discriminatin across airlines and shutting down the channel
of such price discrimination can help to restore eciency.
Table 8 shows the counterfactual welfare change under uniform pricing and grand menu pricing.
In both cases, manufacturers faces higher competition intensity and decreases their price on aver-
age. However, the manufacturers' prot is almost unchanged. Higher competition intensity leads
to lower revenue per unit sales but, at the same time, it increases total production and leads to
lower unit costs via the learning-by-doing eect. In terms of welfare, higher competition intensity
leads the price closer to the long-run marginal cost of production, which helps to restore eciency.
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Table 8: Counterfactual Welfare
Uniform Pricing
Boeing McDonnell Douglas Airlines Total
Welfare Change (in % ) 0:14%  0:89% 10:61% 2:51%
Welfare Change (in $ 1M) 20  9 489 500
Grand Menu Pricing
Welfare Change (in % ) 0:14%  0:10% 10:88% 2:60%
Welfare Change (in $ 1M) 19  2 501 518
As in the previous table, the counterfactual results are similar in both uniform pricing and grand
menu pricing cases, which again suggests ensuring a fair competition environment is important to
help the market mechanism to work well.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, I present evidence that suggests capital misallocation in aircraft and airline industries.
I present a simple theoretical example to show that the learning-by-doing eect in production
and competition among upstream rms lead to aircraft price discrimination. The existence of
economies of scale in production creates a incentive to treat large buyers better, which distorts
both production and allocation of aircraft in favor of large buyers. I further construct and estimate
a dynamic structural model of the industries. The model captures economies of scale in aircraft
production via a learning-by-doing eect and both second and third degree price discrimination
in aircraft market. Using the estimated parameter, I simulate the equilibrium outcome under
alternative pricing regulations. The result suggests that manufacturers' ability to price discriminate
airlines results in lower production of aircraft and lower total welfare. Forcing manufacturers to
treat all airlines equally does not only ensures fair competition in the airline industry but also
increases eciency in both aircraft and airline industries.
36
References
Armstrong, M. and Vickers, J. (2010). Competitive non-linear pricing and bundling. Review of
Economic Studies, 77 (1)30-60:pp. 30{60.
Bajari, P., Benkard, C. L., and Levin, J. (2007). Estimating dynamic models of imperfect compe-
tition. Econometrica, 75(5):pp. 1331{1370.
Benkard, C. L. (2000). Learning and forgetting: The dynamics of aircraft production. American
Economic Review, 90(4):pp. 1034{1054.
Benkard, C. L. (2004). A dynamic analysis of the market for wide-bodied commercial aircraft.
Review of Economic Studies, 71 (3):pp. 581{611.
Benkard, C. L., Jeziorski, P., and Weintraub, G. Y. (2013). Oblivious equilibrium for concentrated
industries. mimeo.
Besanko, D., Dorazelski, U., Kryukov, Y., and Satterthwaite, M. (2010). Learning ‐ by ‐ doing,
organizational forgetting, and industry dynamics. Econometrica, 78 (2):pp. 453{508.
Busse, M. and Rysman, M. (2005). Competition and price discrimination in yellow pages adver-
tising. RAND Journal of Economics, 37:378{390.
Cabral, L. M. B. and Riordan, M. H. (1994). The learning curve, market dominance, and predatory
pricing. RAND Journal of Economics, 62(5):pp. 1115{1140.
Chipty, T. and Snyder, C. M. (1999). The role of rm size in bilateral bargaining: A study of the
cable television industry. Review of Economics and Statistics, 81(2):pp. 326 ‒ 340.
Ellison, S. F. and Snyder, C. (2010). Countervailing power in wholesale pharmaceuticals. Journal
of Industrial Economics, 58(1:pp. 32{53.
Ericson, R. and Pakes, A. (1995). Markov-perfect industry dynamics: A framework for empirical
work. Review of Economic Studies, 62(1):53{82.
37
Foster, L., Haltiwanger, J. C., and Syverson, C. (2008). Reallocation, rm turnover, and eciency:
Selection on productivity or protability? American Economic Review, 98(1):394{425.
Fudenberg, D. and Tirole, J. (1983). Learning-by-doing and market performance. The Bell Journal
of Economics, 14(2):522{530.
Gans, J. S. and King, S. P. (2002). Exclusionary contracts and competition for large buyers.
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 20(9):1363 ‒ 1381.
Gavazza, A. (2011). The role of trading frictions in real asset markets. American Economic Review,
101(4):1106{43.
Hsieh, C.-T. and Klenow, P. J. (2009). Misallocation and manufacturing tfp in china and india.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(4):1403{1448.
Kalouptsidi, M. (2010). Time to build and shipping prices. Working Paper.
Levitt, S. D., List, J. A., and Syverson, C. (2012). Toward an understanding of learning by doing:
Evidence from an automobile assembly plant. mimeo.
Luchs, R., Geylani, T., Dukes, A., and Srinivasan, K. (2010). The end of the robinson-patman
act? evidence from legal case data. Management Science, 56:2123{2133.
Miravete, E. J. (2002). Estimating demand for local telephone service with asymmetric information
and optional calling plans. The Review of Economic Studies, 69 (4):pp. 943{971.
Miravete, E. J. (2003). Choosing the wrong calling plan? ignorance and learning. The American
Economic Review, 93(1):pp. 297{310.
Mortimer, J. H. (2008). Vertical contracts in the video rental industry. Review of Economic
Studies, 75(1):165{199.
Ohashi, H. (2005). Learning by doing, export subsidies, and industry growth: Japanese steel in
the 1950s and 1960s. Journal of International Economics, 66(2):297{323.
38
Pakes, A., Ostrovsky, M., and Berry, S. (2007). Simple estimators for the parameters of discrete
dynamic games (with entry/exit examples). The RAND Journal of Economics, 38(2):pp. 373 ‒
399.
Restuccia, D. and Rogerson, R. (2008). Policy distortions and aggregate productivity with hetero-
geneous establishments. Review of Economic Dynamics, 11(4):707 ‒ 720.
Rochet, J.-C. and Stole, L. A. (2002). Nonlinear pricing with random participation. Review of
Economic Studies, 69 (1):277{311.
Snyder, C. M. (1996). A dynamic theory of countervailing power. The RAND Journal of Eco-
nomics, 27(4):pp. 747{769.
Sorensen, A. T. (2003). Insurer-hospital bargaining: negotiated discounts in post-deregulation
connecticut. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 51(4):pp. 469{490.
Spence, A. M. (1981). The learning curve and competition. The Bell Journal of Economics,
12(1):pp. 49{70.
Stole, L. A. (1995). Nonlinear pricing and oligopoly. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,
4(4):529 ‒ 562.
Thompson, P. (2007). How much did the liberty shipbuilders forget? Management Science,
53(6):pp. 908 ‒ 918.
Thornton, R. A. and Thompson, P. (2001). Learning from experience and learning from others: An
exploration of learning and spillovers in wartime shipbuilding. The American Economic Review,
91(5):pp. 1350{1368.
Villas-Boas, S. B. (2002). Vertical relationships between manufacturers and retailers: Inference
with limited data. Review of Economic Studies, 74:pp. 625 ‒ 652.
Weintraub, G. Y., Benkard, C. L., and Roy, B. V. (2008). Markov perfect industry dynamics with
many rms. Econometrica, 76(6):1375 ‒ 141.
39
Wright, T. P. (1936). Factors aecting the cost of airplanes. Journal of the Aeronautical Sciences,
3(4):122{128.
40
Appendix
Proof of the Proposition 1
For the sake of simplifying the analysis, let me assume that the parameters, c, k and Dti , are in a
range that the marginal revenue from the demand curve Dti is smaller than c  k(D11 +D12) when
the price is c.17
Second Period
Suppose the rst period production of each seller is q11 and q
1
2 where q
1
1  q12. Since S1 has a lower
marginal cost, it undercuts the price of S2 for both buyers to maximize the second period prot.
The lowest price S2 can oer is MC2(q
1
2) and, therefore, the second period prot that S2 can earn
(as a function of q11 and q
1
2) is
21(q
1
1; q
1
2) =
 
D21(MC2(q
1
2)) +D
2
1(MC2(q
1
2))

(MC2(q
1
1) MC2(q12)) = (D21+D22 2c+2kq12)k(q11 q12):
First Period
The following pricing is an equilibrium price in the rst period. S1 and S2 propose the same
linear price p11 = c to buyer 1 and the same linear price p
1
2 < p
1
1 to buyer 2 where p
1
2 satisfy
21(D
1
1(p
1
1) +D
1
2(p
1
2); 0) = (p
1
2   c)D12(p12). At this price, both rms earn prot of zero in total. S1
incurs negative prot in the rst period and get the loss back by earning positive prot in the
second period. S2 does not make any sales and earns zero in both periods.
This is an equilibrium because no seller has an incentive to change the pricing. S2 has no
incentive to change the price in the rst period. In the equilibrium, S2 does not make any sales
and increasing any of the price doesn't increase his prot. If he decrease any of the price in the
rst period, he incurs more loss than the prot he can get in the second period. Similarly, S1 has
no incentive to increase or decrease any of the price.
17This assumption allows us to simplify the second period analysis. If this assumption is not true, the prot
maximizing price of the dominant rm may be strictly lower than the other rm. In such case, we need to derive
the second period equilibrium price. On the other hand, under the assumption, we can directly conclude that the
dominant rm just undercut the other rm.
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Computation of the Counterfactual Equilibrium
In the counterfactual analysis, I again use the same POE concept to nd the counterfactual equi-
librium. The computation of counterfactual equilibrium has an outer loop and an inner loop. In
the inner loop,
1. For a given pricing policy of manufacturers and a given industry long-run average ying
hours, compute the airline's value function and derive the airline's investment policy and air
transportation production behavior,
2. Compute the industry long-run average ying hours given the derived investment policy and
production behavior, and
3. Repeat the steps above until the industry long-run average ying hours converges.
In the outer loop,
1. Given the airline's value function found in the inner loop, nd the equilibrium pricing strategy
of manufacturers,
2. Use the pricing strategy found in step 1 and run the inner loop to get the airline's value
function, and
3. Repeat the steps above until the pricing strategy converges.
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